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ABSTRACT  
Border crossings are considered sites of unique opportunity to identify and protect victims of 
trafficking. UK government reforms have given Border Officers new roles and responsibilities 
as humanitarian first responders. This paper explores how Border Officers reconcile this aspect 
of their work with their role as enforcers of immigration law and their increasingly militarised 
status as protectors of national sovereignty and security. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 
a specialised team of Safeguarding and Anti-trafficking (SAT) Officers at a UK airport, we 
identify the emergence of a distinct SAT subculture, characterised by a sense of moral purpose 
and moral community, and of doing difficult but meaningful and highly-skilled work that 
others are too indifferent, inexpert, or intimidated by to take on.  
Keywords: trafficking; safeguarding; border control; immigration; humanitarian  
Over the last decade, increased awareness of the extent and gravity of human trafficking has 
turned global attention to the development of robust anti-trafficking strategies. These typically 
highlight borders as sites of unique opportunity for states to intervene to prevent trafficking 
(European Commission 2012; European Union 2014; International Organisation for Migration 
2005) and emphasise the crucial role of border officials in victim identification and protection 
(The Centre for Social Justice 2015; European Migration Network 2014; Frontex 2012: 7; 
Eurojust 2012). The UK government’s Modern Slavery Strategy (HM Government 2014) 
reiterates the emphasis on cross-border trafficking – now codified in the 2015 Modern Slavery 
Act – and transposes from the EU Directive into UK legislation the duty of state agencies, 
including border forces, to take proactive measures to identify victims. It also provides for the 
establishment of specialist anti-trafficking and safeguarding (SAT) units, staffed by UK Border 
Force (UKBF) officers at British border crossings.  
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 These changes have come during an era of flux for UKBF. The subject of persistent 
political and public scrutiny, the functions of border and immigration control have been 
reimagined and restructured frequently within government departments since the 1990s. 
Notably, the establishment of the UK Border Agency in 2008 saw the merging of customs and 
immigration and the conscious alignment of border work with law enforcement. This process 
was accelerated in 2012 when UKBF was split from the now defunct Border Agency amid 
accusations of mismanagement and reports that immigration rules had been abandoned and 
border checks relaxed in efforts to deal with bottlenecks of passengers (BBC 2012). 
Announcing the restructure, the Home Secretary, Theresa May declared that the new UKBF 
would need ‘a whole new management culture’ and ‘its own ethos of law enforcement’ (HC 
Deb (2010-12) 20 February vol. 540 c. 623).  Accordingly, the Border Agency was re-launched 
as a Border Force, re-conceptualising it from civil service agency to ‘law-enforcement 
command’ with uniforms, weapons, and powers of arrest to match. These changes involved 
broadening the scope of the ‘border officer’ to cover both the crime-fighting aspects of customs 
enforcement and the more ‘compassionate’, person-centred aspects of immigration control, 
resulting in the retraining of thousands of officers to deal with this new dual aspect of their 
roles. 
While those calling for a victim-centred, human rights-based approach to combatting 
trafficking have welcomed the new priority given to this issue by the UK government, some 
have also criticised the Modern Slavery Act for taking an approach ‘that is deeply embedded 
in a criminal law and border control frameworks’ (Fudge 2015: para 5) whilst doing little to 
address issues related to labour standards and supply chains (Craig 2015). Similarly, questions 
have been raised about the strength of the government’s commitment to protecting victims, 
with advocacy groups suggesting that the legislation sets the threshold for evidence of coercion 
or intent to exploit too high (Harrison 2015). The Act comes at a time when the political rhetoric 
around restricting movement across borders has seldom been so fervent, and it has been argued 
that current immigration policies make the state culpable in creating vulnerability and posing 
a threat to human wellbeing and to migrants’ rights (O’Connell Davidson and Howard 2015; 
Dembour and Kelly 2011). The argument that global anti-trafficking efforts are constrained 
and undermined by the adherence to rigid immigration enforcement has become a staple feature 
of the debate about the policing of international borders (Aas and Gundhus 2015; Chuang 2014; 
Dembour and Kelly 2011; Weber and Pickering 2011; Chacón 2010).  
 3 
 Empirical studies have tended to prioritise the experiences and narratives of victims 
moving between borders (Campbell 2013; Brunovskis and Surtees 2012). This has enriched 
scholarly understanding of how such measures are experienced by those they aim to help. But 
our understanding of the factors shaping anti-trafficking responses at the border is incomplete 
without an examination of the perspectives and experiences of those responsible for enacting 
them (Loftus 2015). Recent years have seen some efforts to close this gap, with illuminating 
ethnographic research into the practices of the EU border agency Frontex (Aas and Gundhus 
2015) and the Australian border force (Pickering and Ham 2014). These studies have focused 
on frontline officers, revealing their attitudes towards the humanitarian aspects of their work 
as well as the policy and legal imperatives that direct it. They highlight the tension between 
humanitarian perspectives and other elements of border force ‘culture’, such as the objective 
to combat organised crime, make dispassionate immigration decisions, and use decision-
making frameworks that rely on ‘strict binaries’ when judging potential victims or agents 
(Pickering and Ham 2014: 16). Such findings resonate with studies of the occupational cultures 
of other criminal justice practitioners – most notably the police service, which has been 
described as struggling with reconciling conceptions of ‘proper’ crime-fighting police work 
with a trend towards the adoption of duties traditionally associated with social work (Aas and 
Gundhus 2014; Loftus 2010). Indeed, anti-trafficking has been identified as one area of police 
work that requires both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing skills, with versatility in switching between 
the two a core competence (Van Dyke 2014). 
This paper contributes to that body of empirical research, reporting on findings from a 
study involving a specialist Safeguarding and Anti-trafficking (SAT) unit within the UK 
Border Force at London’s Heathrow airport. Our investigation reveals how organisational and 
structural shifts in safeguarding and anti-trafficking work are combining to create a SAT 
subculture within the Border Force. It argues that this subculture is characterised by a sense of 
moral purpose and moral community, and of doing difficult but meaningful and highly-skilled 
work that others are too indifferent, inexpert, or intimidated by to take on. We find that SAT 
officers are deeply committed to their work and are rewarded both personally and 
professionally for their efforts through a sense of job satisfaction and promises of career 
advancement.  
We explore the strategies BFOs develop to discharge their newly-acquired 
humanitarian duties in a context in which their legal powers and practical ability to help are 
constrained. Our identification of the SAT subculture underlines the tensions between SAT 
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work that is embedded in a humanitarian agenda and the apparently conflicting pressures to 
control immigration through robust policing of the border. This tension is found in officers’ 
accounts of both their immigration and safeguarding work – not only in relation to the 
challenges they face in making appropriate decisions about individual cases, but also in their 
own attitudes towards these dual aspects of their jobs and the organisational response to their 
endeavours. We identify attempts by UKBF to resolve the conflict between the fulfilment of 
humanitarian duties and the pursuit of immigration control, but also suggest that developments 
are in some respects being undermined by a simultaneous push to make border control a law 
enforcement exercise.   
We argue that the humanitarian border control agenda has not only been embraced 
wholeheartedly by SAT officers, but that it is also prioritized by them (to the extent possible 
given constraints on their powers) over immigration concerns. Nevertheless, we also assert that 
the keen sense of moral purpose described by SAT officers stands in contrast to what is in 
reality a very limited power to protect people from exploitation. 
 
 
Methodology: privileging the accounts of border force officers 
Our aim is to explore how the newly-adopted anti-trafficking agenda is enacted, viewed, and 
experienced by those responsible for its implementation on the ground – a perspective that has 
been given scant attention by researchers previously. With this in mind, it was important to 
recruit from a border crossing point that had already made significant efforts towards 
implementation of that agenda.  
The UK’s Heathrow airport – one of the world’s busiest airports – was an ideal 
candidate. It serves a number of known trafficking routes,1 making opportunities to identify 
and protect victims of trafficking 2  unlikely to be significantly greater at any other port. 
Heathrow SAT teams are among the most well-resourced and well-trained in the UK, and have 
                                                             
1 Traffickers are believed to often prefer air travel routes as these are often the cheapest means of travel (FRA 
2014).  
2 While we are sensitive to the controversies about how best to describe people identified at borders as victims 
or potential victims of trafficking, given the loaded nature of the terms ‘victim’ (Broad 2015; Walklate 2007), 
and ‘potential’, it is not necessary to take a stance on them, much less to rehearse them here. For the purposes of 
this paper we report and follow UKBF practice, without subjecting it to critical analysis.  
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been cited by other airports as a model of best practice.3 This indicates that they have developed 
innovative and practicable ways of accommodating their humanitarian aims with their 
immigration-control functions on the ground. The participating team in this study had been in 
place for over a year, long enough to have developed its own culture and for its members to be 
able to reflect on how their SAT role has affected the way they conceptualise and feel about 
their work. For these reasons, a study of the Heathrow SAT team also promised to be a valuable 
gauge of the general direction of SAT work at airports in the UK as well as an early indicator 
of issues likely to become more prominent (and politically pressing) in the future.  
The Heathrow SAT team had been preceded by discrete Child and Youth Protection 
(CYP) teams and this foundation has proven to be significant for this study. A number of BFOs 
had moved into the SAT team from the previous CYP teams and, perhaps for this reason, their 
motivation was frequently described in the relatively narrow terms of protecting children and 
young people.  
At the time of this study, BFOs applied for a SAT role on a voluntary basis, although 
selection involved a competitive recruitment process. This became a key point of discussion in 
interviews, and meant that Heathrow SAT officers differed from non-SAT officers in notable 
ways.  Although all BFOs received basic e-training on SAT issues and were obliged to look 
out for vulnerable people at border control, SAT officers received extra training and shouldered 
additional SAT-related duties. At the time of this study, the specialist training consisted of a 4-
day course, which, in addition to providing instructions on how to identify and help a potential 
victim of trafficking (PVOT), educated officers about the different kinds of victims and refuted 
popular myths about trafficking.4 The SAT-specific duties included floor-walking – pacing the 
space behind border control points and scanning incoming passengers for indications of 
vulnerability – dealing with safeguarding or trafficking referrals from other officers; 
interviewing, investigating, and caring for suspected victims; making enquiries and engaging 
with external agencies including embassies, social services and the police; and, depending on 
their level of seniority, recommending or authorising an action (e.g. to return an individual to 
                                                             
3 Heathrow’s SAT strategy includes: basic training for all officers; a 15-strong dedicated SAT team who attend a 
specialist 4-day training course; regular liaison meetings with local social services to discuss cooperation and 
issues of mutual concern; anti-trafficking ‘operations’ targeting routes and profiles of passengers thought to be 
used by victims; and a dedicated SAT intelligence officer, amongst other things. 
4 UK Border Force ‘Safeguarding and Trafficking Awareness Training for Higher Officers’ Powerpoint 
presentation training materials provided to the authors by Heathrow SAT team Higher Officer. 
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their country of origin or to refer an individual as a PVOT to a programme of assistance via the 
National Referral Mechanism (NRM)).  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 9 of the 15 BFOs on the SAT team 
and one officer who was not SAT trained in May 2015, on-site at Heathrow Airport. Interviews 
typically lasted for 60 to 90 minutes. The officers we spoke to ranged in seniority and 
experience, as detailed in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 
This exploratory study focuses on privileging the accounts of officers’ experiences of SAT 
work at the border, and as such it was influenced in part by the narrative tradition in social 
research. Questions were minimal, open-ended and designed to elicit personal attitudes, 
opinions, feelings, and experiences. In order to allow issues to emerge as and when they arose 
in the minds of interviewees, we avoided questions that directly referred to humanitarianism or 
human rights, or to conflicts, inconsistencies or ethical dilemmas. We did, however, ask BFOs 
directly to talk about the most challenging aspects of their work, a line of questioning which 
typically prompted responses that related both to the practical difficulties of SAT work and its 
emotional toll.  
Recently, Loftus (2015) has appealed for more research into the practices and 
occupational cultures of border policing, calling in particular for further ethnographic studies. 
We concur that our own research would have benefited from the addition of ethnographic 
observations, which would have allowed insight into the ‘inner life’ and ‘daily grind’ of the 
SAT team (Loftus 2015: 122). However, neither the budget nor time afforded by the wider 
project 5  of which this research comprised a small part permitted this kind of fieldwork. 
Accordingly, the extent to which we are able to compare how participants described their SAT 
work and how they enacted that role in practice is inevitably limited. Similarly, it should be 
noted that our sample size is small and we were concerned with officers with SAT training. 
We did not seek the perspective of those who do not participate in SAT work or to corroborate 
the views of officers we interviewed. 
                                                             
5 A 3-year European Commission-funded project investigating the ethical, legal and efficiency aspects of 
surveillance used to combat organized crime: www.surveille.eu. 
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Revealing a SAT subculture 
In what follows, we conceptualise safeguarding and trafficking work as an example of a distinct 
BFO subculture. Occupational cultures are developed through the shared experiences and 
occupational backgrounds of organisational members, and include the presence of common 
training, mutual support and associated values and norms (Johnson, Chye Koh and Killough 
2009). Within these occupations, groups may form subcultures, providing a way for the group 
to function, react, adapt and integrate new members (Mawby and Worrall 2013). The dearth of 
studies into border police cultures has already been noted and there is a distinct lack of 
comprehensive research and literature on the occupational cultures of criminal justice 
practitioners more generally (Mawby and Worrall 2013). Here, we describe how the SAT team 
subculture, by virtue of its voluntary membership, allows for the furthering of a particular 
(humanitarian) agenda by committed officers whilst giving an ‘opt out’ to those who wish to 
dissent.  
 
SAT work: humanitarian, voluntary and specialised. 
SAT officers reported sharing a deep personal and professional commitment to fulfilling what 
they saw as their humanitarian duties, perceiving themselves as members of a distinctly moral 
rather than merely a professional community. The majority of the BFOs we spoke to described 
their SAT work in clearly humanitarian terms, using phrases such as ‘helping people’ [P7], 
ensuring they are ‘cared for’, ‘protecting’ them ‘from harm’ [P1]; and ‘saving’ them [P8]. 
While a role on the SAT team was considered a useful career move, most of the BFOs we 
spoke to explained their motivation as a recognition of their basic human duties to help others 
in need, rather than by a desire to get ahead professionally: 
Okay, I would like to say it's a job but it isn't.  I have a responsibility. It's just human.  
I'm that character where, basically, if I identify a person in need, you want to help that 
person.  Yeah, so essentially, whether they're a child or an adult, you will help that 
person. It's more the human factor.[P4] 
[I]f I can help any child, any adult, who is in danger coming in the country, I take that 
seriously, yeah. … it's something that…yeah, it's my first priority, I love it. [P6] 
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The voluntary nature of SAT team membership meant that only those BFOs who had ‘opted 
in’ to the humanitarian aspects of the border control policy were required to implement them 
on the ground. The rationale for making the SAT role both voluntary and selective was 
explained as reflecting the importance given to the SAT agenda. Specifically, officers felt the 
process made it more likely that only those who ‘care’, ‘are committed’, ‘want to make a 
difference or do it well’ and have ‘crucial skills’ of ‘communication’ and ‘strength’ are 
entrusted with SAT responsibilities [P8]. As is expanded on below, this combination of moral 
motivations and specialist skills is what characterises SAT subculture.  
All but one of the BFO participants expressed strong identification with and 
commitment to the SAT agenda. However, when placed in the context of border guarding more 
broadly, they presented it as a side-line to core activity, engaged with by a select but dedicated 
few. This development of SAT work as a specialised rather than mainstream area of BFO work 
may reflect the recent drive to make UKBF more like a police force. Nevertheless, perhaps in 
recognition of the different skills, experience, and interests of staff, SAT work was one of a 
range of important functions that were voluntary.  
There was an acceptance among our (SAT-trained) participants that their colleagues 
had entered the force through various routes and may be motivated by a commitment to 
different aspects of the role, which did not necessarily align with their own beliefs in a 
humanitarian agenda. For example, there was a general recognition amongst our participants 
that some BFOs chose not to volunteer for the SAT role because they ‘couldn’t care less [about 
safeguarding and anti-trafficking]’ [P8]. But they also reported that ‘there is a lot of fear’ about 
the extra responsibility that comes with the SAT role [P7] and apprehension about the 
‘emotionally unsettling’ nature of the interactions SAT officers have with the people they are 
trying to help [P8]. This points to clear distinctions being made between the possible ways of 
conceptualising and indeed fulfilling the BFO role, with SAT work being only one option. 
These emerging findings tally with those of Aas and Gundhus’s study of border 
officers’ attitudes to the humanitarian aspects of their work in the context of secondments from 
national border agencies to Frontex, the EU border agency. That study revealed that there ‘seem 
to exist pronounced distinctions within Frontex with regard to how individual officers see their 
role’ and that ‘rather than dealing with a single organizational culture, Frontex functions as a 
patchwork of policing sub-cultures, which the organization is using considerable efforts to 
unite through training, guidelines and supervision’ (Aas and Gundhus 2015: 7). While Frontex 
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subcultures were described as correlating with national cultures, the Heathrow SAT subculture 
seems to correlate in parts with professional background, training, and personal inclinations 
towards helping the vulnerable. Thus, in a mixture similar to that described in Van Dyke’s 
study of a UK police anti-trafficking unit (Van Dyke 2014: 9),  the skills and attitudes 
contributing to the development of the subculture are thus provided by the incumbent SAT 
team and ‘brought in’ by individuals joining the team. 
In contrast to their descriptions of their colleagues, the SAT-trained BFOs we spoke to 
seemed to consider the fulfilment of humanitarian goals (in the form of SAT work) to be as 
much a part of their professional identity as their role in securing the border. For example, 
nearly all of our participants reported that they would always act on SAT indicators even if 
treating the individual as an immigration case (which SAT cases often also are) would be the 
expeditious option: ‘I don't care how busy it is…I'd always make the referral’ [P3]. This makes 
them quite different participants to BFOs whose humanitarian duties have been foisted upon 
them, either by policy or circumstance,6 or who for other reasons question the appropriateness 
of giving those responsible for the enforcement of immigration law duties that are explicitly 
humanitarian (see Aas & Gundhus 2015). 
What appears distinctive about the Heathrow SAT team – and different to the Frontex 
study – is the professionalization and specialisation of this humanitarian aspect of border work 
and, as is discussed later, the heightened recognition of its value. Making it a voluntary, 
specialist activity can be seen as one approach to addressing the tensions inherent in a brief that 
includes both excluding people and protecting them. BFOs in the UK have been criticized for 
prioritizing the deportation of illegal migrants over the identification of victims of trafficking, 
leading to misidentifications of the latter as the former (The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring 
Group 2012).7 Indeed, The Centre for Social Justice (2013) called for the UK Border Agency 
(as it was at the time) to be stripped of its Competent Authority status as its practices were seen 
as incompatible with the protection of trafficking victims. Participants in our study 
acknowledged the fairness of this criticism, reporting the difficulty for BFOs of having both 
immigration control and SAT duties at the forefront of their minds simultaneously, and stating 
                                                             
6 For example, Aas and Gundhus’s (2015) work described BFOs working at unofficial border crossings, in 
remote areas or at sea, who find themselves in situations in which they are faced with people in need of basic 
help to survive, such as water or food.  
7 The UNODC (2008: 9) also points out this risk in their report on human trafficking: ‘An unintended 
consequence of efforts directed principally at illegal migration can be the misidentification and inadvertent re-
victimization of trafficked persons’. For a discussion of this issue in the media see Rhys Jones (2013). 
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that the default tendency, especially of untrained BFOs, is to prioritise their immigration 
function: 
…a lot of the officers here see things only purely in black and white; in other words, 
it's an immigration issue, it's not a safeguarding issue.  It's only when SAT officers 
intervene or say, like, no, this fits the profile that we can intervene.  [P4] 
 
…it is hard, especially for other officers that haven't had the training.  Because our first 
priority is, you've got your immigration hat on first really, and that's always…that's our 
way of thinking. [P1] 
 
Indeed, previous studies have pointed out the dichotomy of having border authorities with the 
simultaneous role of keeping people out whilst also being in charge of the safety of the 
vulnerable (Aas and Gundhus 2015; Weber and Pickering 2011; Pickering 2011). Focusing the 
humanitarian task on a dedicated few could relieve this tension, particularly where the desire 
of some officers to ‘outsource’ this aspect of their work is apparent.  
Our study suggests the Border Force at Heathrow airport is making a concerted effort 
to separate out the tasks of immigration control and SAT work. This is exemplified by the role 
of ‘floor-walkers’. Floor-walkers are SAT-trained officers who pace the space behind the 
border control desks, scanning incoming passengers for signs of vulnerability and pulling them 
out of line for further investigation. BFOs reported that their ability to detect such signs was a 
result of training and regular updates from the Intel team on PVOT profiles.8 Floor-walking is 
used to implement profiles of high-risk routes and passengers, developed by the SAT 
intelligence unit as well as to monitor incoming flights routinely. While a number of the SAT 
officers we spoke to said they believed that all BFOs were trained sufficiently well to identify 
PVOTs, irrespective of whether they had attended the specialist SAT course, they saw floor-
walking as an opportunity to be more attentive to signs of vulnerability, without the interference 
of immigration control considerations and pressures of traveller flow [P2; P3]. Floor-walkers 
act in a SAT capacity exclusively for the duration of their shift – intervening in the border 
                                                             
8 Unlike the findings of a 2007 study examining the basis for immigration decisions at 2 UK airports including 
Heathrow, in which instinct featured as a theme in participants’ reports of the way illegal migrants and PVOTS 
were identified (Woodfield et al 2007)  
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control work of colleagues staffing the desks and potentially overriding their immigration 
decisions when they identify a possible issue of concern: 
 
So if I'm walking on the floor and I'll just be listening in to conversations, that's when 
I'll purely be thinking, you know, is that individual being trafficked in, as opposed to do 
they qualify for entry under immigration legislation.  So yeah, it's a lot easier.  Plus you 
have time to look at the queue, to spot anything that you…you know, any individuals 
that you want to see and check out.  And then you just follow them to the desk and you 
can listen in from there. [P1] 
Floor-walking is also used as part of special operations to profile travellers on routes identified 
as favoured by traffickers. Unlike non-SAT trained BFOs, who receive email updates about 
ongoing operations but may choose not to read or engage with them, SAT officers are regularly 
updated on the indicators relating to specific kinds of trafficking and play an active part in 
informing and developing internal anti-trafficking operations: 
At the moment, we've got Operation X which is Bangladeshi females who are entering 
into forced marriages because they've got henna patterns and they have the initials of 
their husband.  We encountered a 12 year old who was married to her cousin.  And 
that's where it came about because we identified one person and then it comes on to 
say, you know, maybe we should be a bit more vigilant around Bangladeshi females. … 
For example, the Dubai flights bring in a lot of Bangladeshis…so we're going to be 
floor-walking behind. [P1]   
We asked some participants how effective floor-walking is, but most felt unable to answer with 
confidence. It was reported to us by two participants that a recent special operation had yielded 
no PVOT identifications, a fact which surprised them. Nevertheless, the introduction of floor 
walking presents a noteworthy attempt by UKBF to address the conflict between immigration 
control and SAT work by creating a division of labour. However, at the time of the study, the 
presence of floor-walkers was ‘subject to business needs’ [P7], meaning they were not 
authorised when the airport was busy and personnel were all deployed on the control desk.  
While floor-walking was described by some officers as a welcome opportunity to focus 
on SAT work, others recognised that it could be perceived negatively by their colleagues, if 
seen as intervening in their work or undermining their judgement. One junior BFO expressed 
a reluctance to floor-walk for this reason: 
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I wouldn't want to be undermining my colleagues, thinking that they don't know what a 
potential victim of trafficking is, when they probably do.  We should all be able to pick 
up on things that aren't right.’ [P3].  
All BFOs we spoke to agreed that the identification of vulnerable individuals was a basic duty 
of all border officers. Most also thought the specialist SAT training should be rolled out across 
the Force, though the reasons they cited in support of this varied. The training had recently 
become compulsory for all senior officers, and some BFOs claimed this had improved greatly 
the extent to which they felt supported and recognized in their work. Some reported having 
previously felt overburdened with responsibility on occasions when their non-SAT trained 
superiors deferred to them to authorise official designations of vulnerable individuals [P4]. 
Superiors were also described as more supportive when it came to dealing with mistakes or 
complaints once they had received the SAT training [P8]. In relation to new recruits and 
existing staff, most BFOs we spoke to supported universal training as a means of ‘raising 
awareness’ about SAT issues, which they described as often poor amongst BFOs (reflecting 
Pickering and Ham’s Australian findings, 2014: 8) and improve the chances of identifying 
PVOTs: 
Personally, I think all Border Force Officers should have that training, not just a team, 
because it's not every day we're going to be around for advising our colleagues. … If 
all officers were trained to do that, we would be able to identify a little bit more who's 
being trafficked or smuggled through here each day.  [P6] 
However, none of our participants felt that the responsibility to deal with PVOTs once they 
had been identified—a task currently only shouldered by SAT officers–should become 
mandatory for all BFOs. At first glance this exception might seem inconsistent with the 
existence of a mandatory responsibility to deal with illegal migrants and asylum seekers: after 
all, many if not most asylum seekers are also vulnerable people and BFOs are not permitted to 
opt out of dealing with them. Yet, there may be practical reasons relating to the difficulty of 
ensuring BFOs pursue SAT aims in the face of competing immigration concerns. Unlike the 
processing of asylum seekers, which is a standardized, bureaucratic procedure, the 
safeguarding and protection of children and PVOTs requires a significant exercise of 
discretion, communication skills, emotional resilience and devotion of time and effort. While 
asylum seekers generally self-present, it is up to BFOs to identify vulnerable children and 
PVOTs and to decide when to take measures to protect them. In light of this, it is perhaps 
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unsurprising that motivation, commitment, and specific skills are seen as prerequisites for the 
role. 
 
SAT subculture: moral community, moral responsibility, and social work. 
Perhaps the single most defining characteristic of the SAT subculture is a shared commitment 
to the moral cause of helping vulnerable people. SAT work clearly fosters a strong sense of 
moral community among the members of the SAT team. This was evident in the way team 
members described each other and the team as a whole:  
Everyone on the team wants to help these people, wants to make a difference.  [P7] 
I think we're very passionate about what we do here.  We have a very, very dedicated 
and committed team and we're very, very proud of the work they do here.’ [HO2, p.17] 
That's the thing, that's the beauty of the team as well, we do help each other…Because 
it's always the passengers' interests we have at heart, and that's the most important 
thing.  We want to make the right decision.  So as a team, we pull together and do that.’ 
[SAT4, pp.12-13] 
This language of the moral community is seen as a problematic example of ‘humanitarian 
government’ by some observers (Aas and Gundhus 2015; Fassin 2011). They argue that the 
deployment of moral sentiments of compassion, empathy and assistance distracts from 
meaningful discussions about injustice and rights, leaving those charged with ‘helping’ with 
the illusion that solidarity has redeeming powers (Aas and Gundhus 2015; Fassin 2011). 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss the role undertaken by BFOs participating 
in this study as merely a self-serving practice in empathy – officers reported becoming deeply 
and practically involved in ensuring the safety and wellbeing of potential victims. They relayed 
incidents demonstrating that their personal commitment to the SAT cause went above and 
beyond merely fulfilling professional duties, thus reflecting the commitment to ‘go the extra 
mile’ (Van Dyke 2014: 8). For example, one BFO described going to great lengths to gather 
intelligence about the fate awaiting PVOTs in their care, such as investigating whether potential 
employers had a history of exploiting workers or were linked to other companies that did. 
Others described doing significant unpaid overtime to see a case through: 
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[T]here was one case where I think I was coming off my night shift …and this man came 
in with his child.  And I said to him (so on the desk now, the officer) I said to him, well, 
take a seat, I'm going to make some checks.  Within that time span, the child disappeared.  
… So I went down to speak to the father and I goes, where's your child?  “I don't know, 
he's somewhere around”. …The father had no concern about the child at all. … His child 
is just wandering around- “he's bored, he was waiting too long, so he just wandered 
about”.  My God, the child is five years old, this is the child's first time in the UK! ...  And 
I was upset.  And everybody kept on saying, the senior officers kept saying to me, “will 
you go home?” I said, I'm not going home until this child is found.  And I did stay until 
that child was found. [P9]  
In relation to children in particular, BFOs reported voluntarily undertaking safeguarding 
measures that they felt had not been sufficiently carried out by social services. These included 
making phone calls to find out if sponsors were reliable and safe; physically accompanying 
children to the car sent by local authorities to collect them; and reassuring children about the 
care provided by those authorities. Some participants described resisting and challenging what 
they saw as examples of unsatisfactory levels of care and protection offered by children’s 
services. One BFO reported doing extra checks on family sponsors of an arriving child, 
revealing the sponsor to be what the BFO considered an unsuitable carer. The officer claimed 
that sometimes social services would accept care by a relative to be appropriate and safe 
without considering in-depth checks to be necessary: 
‘I really do believe that with social services, as long as that child/adult has family, I think 
they think it's fine.  Not realising, no, it's not fine.  I mean, all the cases out there that 
they have that children have died, you know, they should realise that, [but] no.  But they 
don't.’ [P9] 
Frustration with the perceived indifference of social workers and their reluctance to take 
responsibility for the wellbeing of children was a recurring theme of the interviews: 
…there was one case where, basically, I had to liaise between two social services and 
ask them, somebody take responsibility of this child, I've identified this child in need, it's 
[the local authority’s] ultimate responsibility because they're here and they're paid extra 
for that.  But they didn't want to take notice because that child had previously lived in 
another [local authority] and they're saying that is the other [local authority’s] thingy.  
But I had to liaise between the two. [P1]   
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As this illustrates, SAT officers see themselves as not only taking on some of the sensitive and 
challenging aspects of BFO work that other BFOs do not want to engage in, but also as picking 
up the slack for (perceived) negligent or indifferent social workers. 
 While a number of BFOs we spoke to expressed dissatisfaction with the performance 
of social services in relation to their SAT duties, some also described affinities with social 
workers, especially in terms of the emotional and psychological toll of their work. For example, 
one BFO mentioned asking to be removed from the team when things became too stressful and 
upsetting: 
It's like social workers, you see some really bad things and then you get a bit 
disillusioned, so you want to just take a step back from it.  And that is what happens 
sometimes here…And I will say for myself, it has happened because I've had to deal 
with some things and I'm thinking that is too much. [P4] 
In another case a BFO described asking to step down from the SAT team after it transpired that 
an individual they granted access to had gone on to be exploited. What was framed as the fear 
of the ‘social work’ aspects of SAT work – including the moral and professional responsibility 
– were cited as reasons why some BFOs may choose not to volunteer for the role: 
I think people may be a little bit scared of the SAT team because it's quite…you're 
responsible, it's quite a massive responsibility when you're dealing with vulnerable 
people.  You know, you need to make sure you're putting the right measures in place 
and you've got to be quite sensitive.  I'm not saying insensitive people aren't applying 
but I think it's quite…some people might get emotionally involved and don't want to.  
[P5] 
And the potential, as I said earlier, if you've let a child go and then you find out 
something bad happened to them, to have that come back to you would haunt you.  I 
know it would me, I'd think exactly that, if I found out that I had let a child go through, 
or even an adult, and I was responsible, I was the last person that person saw before 
going on to something horrible, I would feel horrendous.  And I think that's what most 
people were telling me when I first joined the team, I shouldn't have joined the team for 
that reason.  But then my reasons were, well, I want to try and help them, as opposed 
to thinking about my own back.  But yeah, I think there is a lot of fear. [P7] 
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While participants were only speculating on the reasons why others may not volunteer for SAT 
work, it is striking that fear of responsibility and consequence were cited rather than the 
association between the Border Force and ‘soft’ social work somehow undermining the 
‘masculine’ role of border policing. Loftus’ (2010) well-cited ethnography of police culture 
identified this tension between ‘soft’ and ‘masculine’ work in relation to the police service in 
England. Over the last decade there has been significant expansion of the traditional police role 
into the domain of more ‘caring’ social work-type roles –a process that has come to be known 
as ‘wide policing’ (Millie 2013: 149). Loftus’s work indicates that, despite these changes, 
police officers continued to be keen to distance themselves from social workers, and to contrast 
fighting crime and locking people up, which they saw as ‘real’ police work, with what was 
described by one police officer as the ‘mollycoddling’ of social work (Loftus 2010: 5).  
Our findings suggest that with respect to the elevation of ‘masculine’, law-enforcement 
practices over ‘soft’, caring ones, the SAT subculture does not emulate police culture as closely 
as may have been expected. On the contrary, some of the newly-introduced police-like 
elements of the BFO image, such as the police-style uniforms, were seen by participants as 
intentionally ‘intimidating’ [P7 and P9] and as frustratingly unhelpful to BFOs trying to carry 
out SAT work [P9]9. Nevertheless, this view must be balanced with the apparent political desire 
to foster ‘a tough law enforcement culture’ 10  within UKBF that actively encourages the 
recruitment of ex-military and police personnel (Border Force 2014). Once again this illustrates 
the tensions and mixed messages resulting from the recent organisational recasting of BFOs as 
both enforcers of border security and protectors of vulnerable people. 
 
What SAT work gives back: rewards both personal and professional 
While there are undoubtedly a range of reasons for the greater openness to social work-type 
roles amongst BFOs as compared to the police, it is notable that SAT work was reported as 
being prioritised and valued by UKBF and the management at Heathrow airport. For those 
BFOs who had previously been involved in the CYP teams, this new emphasis on SAT work 
                                                             
9 The darker colour of the new UKBF uniforms unveiled in 2014 was noted in the press and linked to 
studies suggesting they increased citizens’ perceptions of officers as aggressive (Leitch 2014).   
10 This phrase was used by the interim Director General, Immigration Enforcement Directorate in 
evidence given to the Home Affairs Committee in 2013 (Home Affairs Committee 2013-14, Ev 13). 
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was welcomed, and seen as giving overdue professional recognition to previously undervalued 
efforts: 
So what I like about this is that …it's recognised at all levels that we are doing 
important work and we are getting congratulated, recognised.  You know, it's there, 
there's that appreciation that yes, you are doing a good job and stuff.  [P4] 
By way of contrast, other immigration-related aspects of BFO work were seen as involving 
less complex and valuable skills and therefore less deserving of praise: 
And we say now that there's a lot more kudos in protecting someone who's vulnerable 
than getting someone refused because they've got a forged passport.  And so that is 
changing, I think, a little.  Because we used to have whiteboards: ‘Officer so and so's 
got so many forgeries’.  And it's like well, hang on, finding a forgery, anyone can find 
a forgery once you've been on a forgery course, you know.  You've got to have your wits 
about you to identify those little indicators that [a PVOT] is there. [P3] 
This participant did not elaborate on the reasons why they believe indicators of trafficking are 
considered more difficult to spot than those of forgery. However, many of the initial indicators 
of trafficking also signal intent to migrate illegally – for example, carrying forged documents. 
Distinguishing between an illegal migrant and a PVOT therefore requires BFOs to be attentive 
to the presence of additional indicators suggestive of trafficking. A further reason may be that 
the variation in trafficking cases is far more diverse than that in false passports, a fact that is 
reflected in the training documents for frontline staff on forgery (Home Office, 2014a) and 
trafficking (Home Office, 2014b). The above quote suggests that, as well as providing 
encouragement and recognition to BFOs already committed to the SAT cause, the 
professionalization of SAT work is being used to encourage new recruits to the SAT team, 
through an enticing mix of moral purpose and the promise of career advancement.  
Beyond professional recognition, BFOs also reported gaining great personal rewards 
from SAT work. Indeed, our participants were keen to point out that despite the frustrations 
and emotional strains of the job the rewards were a powerful incentive. One SAT officer 
described the personal impact of a successful outcome to an anti-trafficking investigation 
involving two girls trafficked into the UK for the purposes of sexual exploitation: 
[It was] the best day of my life, I remember it, it was the [date given] … I had a phone 
call from [name of airport] Intel. … they were travelling again as imposters on forged 
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documents, going to Spain. One girl was stopped by the Spanish authorities and she 
was removed back to [name of airport].  So that's when we had everyone go and meet 
her because we've got a viable victim who's been trafficked twice. … One girl …  I can't 
talk a lot about her but she's safe.  We know where she is, she's safe.  And we're hoping 
that she will give evidence against [name of trafficker] when she's extradited.  The other 
girl, she's in the UK and she's gone through the NRM process obviously, she was 
granted.  She was helping the police with their enquiries because she was giving 
evidence in court. And she's got leave to be here in the UK. [P3]  
Others contrasted the considerable personal rewards they received from SAT work with the 
relatively poor rewards of immigration control, perhaps revealing a latent ambivalence about 
the value of their work as BFOs more generally: 
…it's one of the few areas actually of work, I think, where you can actually feel a 
tangible reward. It's not very rewarding refusing people and sending them home.  You 
know. Even though that's your job, it's not a really positive thing, is it? Especially when 
somebody's spent their entire life savings.  But if you've saved somebody from 
prostitution, domestic servitude, working on a beach picking cockles, actually that's a 
pretty big thing, I think, for me.  … It's very rewarding … [P8] 
Notable in this quote is the contrast between the description of immigration work as an 
unrewarding task that nevertheless has to be done, and the almost heroic rewards of SAT work. 
Of significance also is the contrast between the great sense of responsibility expressed by BFOs 
in relation to the fate of PVOTs, and the lack of an equivalent sense of responsibility for the 
fate of non-PVOT migrants. This discrepancy may reflect the relative lack of discretion 
afforded BFOs in relation to immigration cases as compared to SAT cases. 
 
Rationalising SAT outcomes: from moral responsibility to shifting the burden 
BFOs discussed different strategies for discharging their moral responsibilities, in a situation 
in which the vast majority of those identified as PVOTs refuse offers of help through the 
National Referral Mechanism (NRM). One BFO reported trying to gather as much evidence as 
possible (from police databases, calls to visa-sponsors to establish credentials, scrutiny of 
nominated employers) about the PVOT’s impending exploitation to present to the individual 
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to enable them to make an informed, and therefore more autonomous, decision about whether 
to accept help: 
I mean, we do try and tell the passenger as much as possible about where they're going 
because they have to make an informed decision as to whether or not they want to be 
part of the NRM process. So we have to…we try to convey to them how dire the situation 
could be, make sure that the decision is theirs.  Because we're not the moral police, we 
can't tell you if you're going to be okay, but we have concerns and if you want, we can 
facilitate your return home. If that person decides no, I'd rather take the risk, then that's 
their burden as opposed to our burden … [P7] 
This line of argument reveals the BFO’s belief that they are discharging their responsibility by 
shifting the burden back onto the PVOT. This participant preferred not to consider the 
possibility that a PVOT may be a victim of threats or coercion rather than merely deception. 
Yet if the person in question is subject to threats towards themselves or, as has been reported 
(Surtees, 2007), towards their families back home, compelling information is unlikely, of itself, 
to ensure or even increase the extent to which any decision to refuse help is genuinely ‘theirs’.  
Other BFOs reported wishing they had greater powers to override a PVOT’s refusal of help 
and to require them to register as at-risk, as the law permits BFOs to do with children [P8]. 
BFOs also reported discharging their moral responsibilities by returning suspected 
PVOTs to their country of origin. Thus recasting what is essentially an immigration control 
measure as a paternalistic, humanitarian act: 
Even if they don't co-operate, you can have the safeguard measure of refusing them… 
So you have that additional kind of, I can do something for this person, even if they 
won't co-operate, if the immigration legislation supports it.  [P8] 
When asked how a forced return equated to a safeguarding act, two BFOs reported that 
UKBF liaised with agencies in the return country, including embassies and airline liaison 
officers, in order to inform them about the impending arrival of a vulnerable individual and 
allow them to initiate (unspecified) protective measures. Yet it is unclear how much these 
efforts result in a material reduction in the risk to suspected victims. UKBF does not follow 
up these cases once the responsible BFO has passed the intelligence on to the relevant agency 
[P7] so it is difficult to assess the impact of this measure. BFOs seemed to show 
unquestioning belief in the potential of forced return to protect individuals, which both 
appears unjustified, and contrasts with the ‘fear’ [P4] and ‘anguish’ [P7] some described at 
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the thought of mistakenly allowing a victim to enter the country. The lack of UKBF protocols 
for following up cases of returned victims allows this blind faith to persist, by ensuring that 
BFOs will not be faced with the human consequences of forced returns. This relative lack of 
accountability for forced returns may be encouraging their use as a means of protection, even 
in the face of little or no evidence of their effectiveness.  
While equating the forcible return of suspected PVOTs with the discharging of a 
moral responsibility to protect them seems a self-serving aspect of SAT culture, it may also 
make SAT culture complicit in a prioritisation of border control aims over the protection of 
the vulnerable. Even if they do help in some instances, it is far from clear that forced returns 
are an effective safeguarding tool; what is certain is that they are powerful tools for 
influencing the location of future trafficking crimes, because the return of suspected victims 
can displace, at least in the short term, the risk of trafficking crime from the UK. Thus while 
removals are ostensibly used to promote humanitarian protection, their only clear benefit is to 
the security and economy of the UK, in the form of reducing crime and the burden on the 
state of supporting vulnerable PVOTS.  
Despite what is emerging as a modest ability to help victims of trafficking the  desire 
amongst BFOs to feel that they have discharged their moral responsibilities to suspected 
victims, was widely shared. As one officer explained it:  
We've got a lot of officers who really, really care about it, they have to feel that they're 
doing something. [P8]  
This was seemingly encouraged by UKBF. Asked whether the training heightened the sense of 
responsibility, one BFO said:  
Yeah.  Absolutely, yeah.  Especially as we've had quite a strong emphasis on making 
sure we don't miss them.  And a lot of pressure, especially during the training, there 
was a lot of pressure. So, you know, you are the last person that person may see that 
could help them because once they pass you, they may be gone forever.  So there is a 
certain amount of responsibility that we have to burden. [P7] 
This also reflects the great emphasis placed by EU and UK policymakers on the border as a 
site of unique potential for the identification and protection of victims of trafficking 
(International Organisation for Migraton 2005; Frontex 2012: 7; Eurojust 2012; Centre for 
Social Justice 2013; European Migration Network 2014). Yet it is hard to grasp the tangible 
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difference this emphasis on the border, and the corresponding priority given to the SAT agenda, 
is making to the plight of victims. There is no UKBF follow-up with suspected victims who do 
not consent to enter the NRM process. Nor, it was confirmed to us in meetings with relevant 
Home Office officials, is there any on-going research with identified victims to find out why 
they did not consent to referral at the border and what, if anything, might have encouraged 
them to accept or even seek help offered by BFOs. This makes it difficult, both for BFOs 
working on the ground, and for scholars, to know whether there is more that could be done at 
the border to help victims, and therefore whether BFOs’ sense of responsibility is proportionate 
to their actual power to help. 11 
 
Conclusion 
Our findings have shown that SAT officers at Heathrow are deeply committed morally to the 
work they do, that they describe prioritising the protection of vulnerable people over 
immigration concerns both in principle and in practice, so far as their relatively constrained 
powers permit. This commitment is somewhat facilitated by organisational changes, including 
training, use of resources, and a conscious elevation of the professional status of humanitarian 
work.  
Our study also sheds light on the approach adopted by Heathrow Border Force to 
resolve the potential conflict between the need to fulfil humanitarian duties and implement 
effective immigration control. This approach involves efforts to professionalise SAT work by 
making it voluntary and skilled. It also involves efforts to separate out the humanitarian and 
immigration functions of BFO work, by creating purely SAT shifts, in the form of floor-
walking and by giving floor-walking SAT officers the operational authority (though perhaps 
not routinely the opportunity) to intervene in and stop immigration processes initiated by other 
BFOs. However, a question for further consideration is how far this operational approach is 
being undermined by the apparent political drive to render more like a police force the border-
control arm of the state. 
Our participants were without exception positive in their assessment of their 
                                                             
11 The excellent empirical work by Fafo and the Nexus Institute (Brunovskis and Surtees 2012) in relation to 
this issue highlights the dire need for an approach to anti-trafficking research that takes as its focus the entire 
story of a victim of trafficking, with all the missed, declined, and botched opportunities to gain help taken into 
account against the background of the psychological and material situation of the victim at the time.  
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organisation’s approach to developing and pursuing the SAT strategy. On the face of it, this 
confidence is at odds with the statistical picture of the success of that strategy. For example, in 
the first quarter of 2015, only 2% of referrals by state agencies to the UK’s National Referral 
Mechanism emanated from the UKBF.12 This contrasts with the great emphasis placed by 
policy makers on the border as a site of opportunity to intervene and protect victims of 
trafficking. It prompts the following question: where do BFOs perceive the key challenges to 
effective SAT work as lying, if not within the institution of the Border Force? We have not 
been able to examine that question here. Yet it is worth noting that all but one of the BFOs we 
spoke to identified those challenges as lying in current limits to their legal powers to intervene 
with victims to protect them. In particular, their responses revealed that the lack of new BFO 
powers to match their new humanitarian duties forces them to use their immigration powers 
opportunistically for humanitarian aims (Authors, forthcoming). This suggests a further 
dimension of anti-trafficking work in which the pursuit of immigration controls may both 
facilitate and constrain the newly-acquired humanitarian purposes of those charged with 
enforcing our borders.   
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Table 1 Interview Participants 
Position Number 
interviewed 
Responsibility 
Assistant Immigration 
Officer 
1 Processing asylum claims and assisting on 
cases of ‘doubtful visitors’. Not SAT trained. 
Immigration Officer with 
SAT training 
5 Assessing passenger documentation, such as 
passports and visas. Make referrals for 
‘doubtful visitors’. Deal with referrals from 
other immigration officers in relation to 
safeguarding and trafficking concerns. 
Immigration Officer 
(intelligence) 
1 Coordinating and responding to 
safeguarding and trafficking intel. 
Immigration Officer (higher) 2 Manage staff and deal with passenger 
referrals made by immigration officers. 
Immigration Officer (senior) 1 SAT strategic lead. Manages team of higher 
and SAT trained officers. 
 
 
